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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
Thus an ordinance requiring a "full report" of automobile accidents was
held invalid as requiring self-incrimination.12 These cases would indicate
that a conviction could not constitutionally be secured where the time card
is the only evidence. In the other line of cases, statutes requiring a motorist
in an accident merely to report his name, address and license number have
generally been held valid13 on the ground that the operation of a car on the
public highway is not a right but a privilege which, under the police power,
may be granted upon condition.14
There are, of course, important differences between problems presented
by the private motorist and the truck driver which may justify differences
in regulation. The individual motorist may occasionally be involved in an
auto accident, a conviction for which could be procured by evidence other
than that furnished by his own report. Further, the statutory requirement
of a report is not designed to be preventive of violation of the law. In
respect to a truck driver, on the other hand, it is manifestly impossible to
enforce the piohibitions of the New York statute in question otheiwise than
by requiring reports and permitting convictions based thereon. In addition,
it is the excessively long periods truck drivers operate which, unless pro-
hibited, occasion accidents. The statute requiring the filing of a report was
designed to prevent this. In this situation a court might feel that con-
siderations of policy against self-incrimination were overweighed by the
broad public policy behind the legislative enactment and it might sustain a
conviction on the basis of the evidence obtained from the time card alone.
This view seems to be supported even by the statement in the instant case
that "the obvious purpose of this law was to safeguard travelers upon the
highways."1
V. M.
EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY OF MOTION PICTURES-[Missouri] .- Plaintiff,
while working in a clay mine, was injured by a premature explosion of dyna-
mite manufactured by the defendant company. To controvert plaintiff's alle-
gation of defendant's negligence in mixing the explosive and non-explosive
elements of the dynamite, defendant offered in evidence motion pictures of
the manufacturing process. Although the case was reversed and remanded,
the court upheld the refusal of the lower court to admit the motion pictures
on the grounds that the film contained irrelevant and prejudicial matter.
However, the court stated that motion pictures are admissible in evidence
12. Rembrandt v. Cleveland (1927) 28 Ohio App. 4, 161 N. E. 364.
13. Lashley v. State (1938) 236 Ala. 1, 180 So. 717, (1938) 28 Ala. App.
86, 180 So. 720; People v. Diller (1914) 24 Cal. App. 799, 142 Pac. 797; In re
.Jones (Fla. 198:8) 178 So. 424; Ex parte Kneedler (1912) 243 Mo. 632,
147 S. W. 983, Ann. Cas. 1913C 923, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 622; State v.
Sterrin (1916) 78 N. H. 220, 98 At. 483; People v. Rosenheimer (1913)
209 N. Y. 115, 102 N. E. 530, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 977; Commonwealth v.
Showers (1937) 32 Pa. Dis. & Cty. Rep. 264.
14. Sce note 1,3, supra, and 8 Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law
f,,,l PractWe (Pern. ed. 1935) 134, 135, sec. 5399.
17,. (N. Y. 1989) 24 N. E. (2d) 105, 107.
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subject to the discretion of the court and the rules of evidence governing
the admission of still pictures.1
This is the first Missouri decision on the admissibility of motion pictures.2
Although few appellate courts have considered the matter,3 lower courts in
several states4 have permitted litigants to exhibit motion pictures to
juries. This type of evidence has been offered most frequently in personal
injury actions to depict the physical condition of the plaintiff after the
accident.5 Sometimes, as in the instant case, motion pictures have been sub-
mitted to display a manufacturing process or mechanical operation.0 In a
single case, a talking motion picture of the confession of one accused of lar-
ceny was allowed in evidence. 7
The admission of motion pictures is governed by the discretion of the
trial court.8 As in the case of still pictures, the court must decide whether
the films are relevant, 9 accurate, 10 objective and non-prejudicial,11 and
1. Morris v. E. I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. (Mo. 1940) Unreported.
2. In Snyder v. American Car & Foundry Co. (1929) 322 Mo. 147, 14
S. W. (2d) 603, motion pictures were admitted to show that plaintiff was
not injured as claimed. However, the court on appeal did not have before
it the issue of motion pictures as evidence.
3. Cal., D. C., Md., Mich., Neb., N. Y., Pa., Tex., Fed.
4. Approved by the appellate court: Cal., Fla., Mich., Neb., N. Y., Pa.
No appellate court ruling: Conn., Ill., Minn., Mo., Ohio. See Note (1932)
27 Ill. L. Rev. 424; 2 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1923) 107, sec. 798; Wig-
more, Evidence (Supp. 1934) 338, sec. 798a.
5. In the following cases, in which defendant offered motion pictures to
show that plaintiff had not been injured as claimed, films were held to be
admissible: Heiman v. Market St. Ry. (1937) 21 Cal. App. (2d) 311, 69 P.(2d) 178; Denison v. Omaha & C. B. St. Ry. (1938) 135 Neb. 307, 280
N. W. 905; Boyarsky v. Zimmerman Corp. (1934) 240 App. Div. 361, 270
N. Y. S. 134; Smalley v. New York Cent. Ry. (1935) 2 U. S. L. Week 578,
commented on in (1935) 20 ST. Louis LAw Rnmvw 280. In Rogers v. De-
troit (1939) 289 Mich. 86, 286 N. W. 167, the court upheld the admission
of motion pictures offered by plaintiff's counsel to demonstrate the phy-
sical condition of plaintiff, who was too ill to attend the trial. In Gulf Life
Ins. Co. v. Stossel (1938) 131 Fla. 127, 179 So. 163 (movies admitted), and
Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Worthy (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) 9 S. W.(2d) 388 (movies excluded for failure to authenticate), the defendant in-
surance companies submitted motion pictures to show that plaintiffs were
not injured or disabled.
6. Pandolfo v. United States (C. C. A. 7, 1922) 286 Fed. 8; De Camp v.
United States (App. D. C. 1926) 10 F. (2d) 984; State for Use of Chima v.
United Rys. & Elec. Co. (1932) 162 Md. 404, 159 Atl. 916, 83 A. L. R. 1307.
7. Commonwealth v. Roller (1930) 100 Pa. Super. 125.
8. De Camp v. United States (App. D. C. 1926) 10 F. (2d) 984; Heiman
v. Market St. Ry. (1937) 21 Cal. App. (2d) 311, 69 P. (2d) 178; State for
Use of Chima v. United Rys. & Elec. Co. (1932) 162 Md. 404, 159 Atl. 916,
83 A. L. R. 1307; Rogers v. Detroit (1939) 289 Mich. 86, 286 N. W. 167;
Denison v. Omaha & C. B. St. Ry. (1938) 135 Neb. 307, 280 N. W. 905; Boy-
arsky v. Zimmerman Corp. (1934) 240 App. Div. 361, 270 N. Y. S. 134;
Commonwealth v. Roller (1930) 100 Pa. Super. 125; Massachusetts Bond-
ing & Ins. Co. v. Worthy (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) 9 S. W. (2d) 388.
9. Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Stossel (1938) 131 Fla. 127, 179 So. 163; Gibson
v. Gunn (1923) 206 App. Div. 464, 202 N. Y. S. 19.
10. Pandolfo v. United States (C. C. A. 7, 1922) 286 Fed. 8; Heiman
v. Market St. Ry. (1937) 21 Cal. App. (2d) 311, 69 P. (2d) 178; Gulf Life
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sufficiently authenticated by the photographer or an eyewitness of the events
recorded.12 But motion pictures supply additional opportunities for the
exercise of judicial discretion. A court may exclude motion pictures on the
grounds that their projection would be inconvenient,13 or that they would
provide merely a spectacular repetition of matters already in evidence. 14
The court may also require expert testimony to the effect that the films
will be projected at the exact speed at which they were taken.15
The cases suggest a question of procedure: Should a lower court view
motion pictures before passing on their admissibility? The instant case
implies, logically, that when the party offering the evidence discloses facts
which make the films inadmissible, the court can exercise its discretion
without looking at the pictures. However, it would seem desirable that a
court inspect proffered films before admitting or rejecting them when coun-
sel fails to reveal disqualifying information. Irrevocable harm might be
done if the court, in reliance on information furnished by the attorney
offering the films, should permit the jury to see inadmissible pictures. An
instruction to disregard could hardly eradicate from the minds of the jurors
the vivid impression created by moving, pictorial representations.
T. B.
FEDERAL JURISDICTION - INTERPLEADER - DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP -
[United States].-To determine conflicting rights to stock and dividends, a
Washington corporation interpleaded citizens of Washington and of Idaho
in a federal district court in Washington. The property involved was de-
posited with the court. For jurisdiction the Federal Interpleader Act'
requires "* * * two or more adverse claimants, citizens of different states
* * *." The question of jurisdiction was first raised by the Supreme Court
on its own initiative. Held, that the real controversy was between the ad-
Ins. Co. v. Stossel (1938) 131 Fla. 127, 179 So. 163; State for Use of Chima
v. United Rys. & Elec. Co. (1932) 162 Md. 404, 159 Atl. 916, 83 A. L. R.
1307; Rogers v. Detroit (1939) 289 Mich. 86, 286 N. W. 167; Common-
wealth v. Roller (1930) 100 Pa. Super. 125.
11. Morris v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. (Mo. 1940) Unreported;
Pandolfo v. United States (C. C. A. 7, 1922) 286 Fed. 8.
12. Heiman v. Market St. Ry. (1937) 21 Cal. App. (2d) 311, 69 P. (2d)
178; De Camp v. United States (App. D. C. 1926) 10 F. (2d) 984; Gulf
Life Ins. Co. v. Stossel (1938) 131 Fla. 127, 179 So. 163; Rogers v. Detroit
(1939) 289 Mich. 86, 286 N. W. 167; Commonwealth v. Roller (1930) 100
Pa. Super. 125.
13. State for Use of Chima v. United Rys. & Elec. Co. (1932) 162 Md.
404, 159 Atl. 916, 83 A. L. R. 1307; Boyarsky v. Zimmerman Corp. (1934)
240 App. Div. 361, 270 N. Y. S. 134.
14. Boyarsky v. Zimmerman Corp. (1934) 240 App. Div. 361, 270
N. Y. S. 134. See De Camp v. United States (App. D. C. 1926) 10 F. (2d)
984.
15. See State for Use of Chima v. United Rys. & Elec. Co. (1932) 162
Md. 404, 159 Atl. 916, 83 A. L. R. 1307; Commonwealth v. Roller (1930)
100 Pa. Super. 125.
1. Act of January 20, 1936, 49 Stat. 1096, (1939 Supp.) 28 U. S. C. A. sec.
41(26).
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